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An influential model suggests that dopamine signals the difference between predicted
and experienced reward. In this way, dopamine can act as a learning signal that can
shape behaviors to maximize rewards and avoid punishments. Dopamine is also thought to
invigorate reward seeking behavior. Loss of dopamine signaling is the major abnormality in
Parkinson’s disease. Dopamine agonists have been implicated in the occurrence of impulse
control disorders in Parkinson’s disease patients, the most common being pathological
gambling, compulsive sexual behavior, and compulsive buying. Recently, a number of
functional imaging studies investigating impulse control disorders in Parkinson’s disease
have been published. Here we review this literature, and attempt to place it within a
decision-making framework in which potential gains and losses are evaluated to arrive
at optimum choices. We also provide a hypothetical but still incomplete model on the
effect of dopamine agonist treatment on these value and risk assessments. Two of the
main brain structures thought to be involved in computing aspects of reward and loss are
the ventral striatum (VStr) and the insula, both dopamine projection sites. Both structures
are consistently implicated in functional brain imaging studies of pathological gambling in
Parkinson’s disease.
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GAMBLING AS A DISORDER OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT
PROCESSING
Pathological gambling can be conceptualized as a disorder of
reward and punishment processing, whereby the gambler selects
an immediate but risky opportunity to obtain money over
the larger, more probable opportunity to save money (Ochoa
et al., 2013). Indeed, gambling is typically conceptualized as
a disorder of impulsivity, in which decision-making is rash
and relatively uninfluenced by future consequences. Patholog-
ical gamblers demonstrate increased impulsivity and increased
delayed discounting on laboratory measures (Verdejo-Garcia
et al., 2008). The coupling of increased reward seeking behav-
ior with insensitivity to negative consequences may explain the
persistence of gambling in the face of overall monetary losses
(Vitaro et al., 1999; Petry, 2001b; Cavedini et al., 2002). This
conceptual framework is similar to that used in drug addic-
tion, where seeking immediate gains while minimizing potential
risks is ubiquitous. Hallmarks of addiction include cravings or
compulsions, a loss of control, and continued engagement in
behaviors that maintain the addiction despite repeated negative
consequences (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Simi-
larly, pathological gambling can be referred to as a behavioral
addiction because it shares many common features with drug-
addiction, such as compulsion and loss of control over one’s
behavior, as well as continuation of the behavior in the face
of negative consequences (Grant et al., 2006; Goodman, 2008).
Pathological gamblers exhibit uncontrollable cravings, tolerance,
habituation, and withdrawal symptoms, similar to those of drug
addicts (Wray and Dickerson, 1981; Castellani and Rugle, 1995;
Duvarci and Varan, 2000; Potenza et al., 2003). Moreover, both
pathological gambling and substance abuse are associated with
the same specific personality traits, namely sensation seeking and
impulsivity (Zuckerman and Neeb, 1979; Castellani and Rugle,
1995), which index heightened arousal to potential rewards and
reduced self-control and inhibitory function. The high comor-
bidity between substance dependence (drugs and alcohol) and
pathological gambling (Petry, 2001a; Petry et al., 2005), and
evidence for common genetic factors, point to the two disorders
having overlapping etiologies (Slutske et al., 2000; Goodman,
2008).
One useful model views reward and punishment learning as
inherent components in the decision-making process. Decision-
making can be broken down to the weighing of the probabil-
ity and value of reward against potential costs (e.g., negative
consequences). Other factors such as outcome ambiguity and
variance (sometimes referred to as risk) also affect individual
choices (Huettel et al., 2006), but here we will only consider
potential gains and losses as determinants of decision-making
while gambling. We will also take “risk” to mean the potential
loss attached to any choice. Risk, as so defined, increases with
the magnitude and probability of potential losses. In fact, risk-
taking may be seen as an indicator of the balance existing between
computations of potential gains and losses. Two of the main
brain structures thought to be involved in these computations
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are the ventral striatum (VStr) and the insula, both dopamine
projection sites. Both have been linked to computations of value,
with the VStr being especially responsive to reward prediction
error (RPE), encoding gain anticipation positively and loss antici-
pation negatively (Rutledge et al., 2010; Bartra et al., 2013), and
the insula responding predominantly to losses and loss antici-
pation in some studies (Knutson and Greer, 2008) or to both
positive and negative outcomes in others (Campbell-Meiklejohn
et al., 2008; Rutledge et al., 2010). Bartra et al.’s meta-analysis
(Figure 1) suggests that the insula encodes arousal or salience
as opposed to value, as it responds positively to both gains
and losses. This meta-analysis also raises the possibility of a
greater role for the insula in the assessment of risk and losses
than gains (compare panels A and B in Figure 1). Alteration
of the balance between these gain and loss anticipation sys-
tems may underlie the inappropriate choice behaviors that occur
in disorders such as addiction, gambling and impulse control
disorders.
Recent research suggests that differences in brain function,
structure, and biochemistry are present in those who develop
gambling problems, with dopamine being a common etiolog-
ical factor. Imaging studies have demonstrated an increase in
mesolimbic dopamine release during gambling tasks in healthy
subjects (Thut et al., 1997; Zald et al., 2004; Hakyemez et al.,
2008). However it should be noted that unpredictable reward
tasks have the ability to cause a suppression and enhance-
ment of dopamine transmission in different regions of the
striatum (Zald et al., 2004; Hakyemez et al., 2008). Earlier
research on pathological gamblers suggested altered dopamin-
ergic and noradrenergic systems, as found through a decrease
in concentration of dopamine and an increase in cerebrospinal
fluid levels of 3,4-dihydroxyphenyl-acetic acid and homovanilic
acid (Bergh et al., 1997). Pathological gamblers have also been
reported to have higher cerebrospinal fluid levels of 3-methoxy-
4-hydroxyphenylglycol, a major metabolite of norepinephrine, as
well as significantly greater urinary outputs of norepinephrine in
comparison to controls (Roy et al., 1988), indicative of a func-
tional disturbance of the noradrenergic system. In addition there
is evidence that genetic polymorphisms affecting dopaminergic
neurotransmission act as risk factors for problem gambling (Lobo
and Kennedy, 2006).
DOPAMINE IN REINFORCEMENT
Considerable evidence from animal studies, implicating
dopamine in behavioral reinforcement, provides a
neurobiological substrate that could encompass processing
of natural rewards, such as food and sex, as well as drugs of
abuse and pathological gambling (Di Chiara and Imperato, 1988;
Wise and Rompre, 1989; Wise, 1996, 2013). The observations of
Schultz and others (Schultz et al., 1998; Schultz, 2002) confirmed
a role for dopamine neurons in response to rewards; however
the current model of dopamine signaling can be traced to a
seminal paper by Montague, Dayan and Schultz (Schultz et al.,
1997), where it was argued that the firing pattern of dopamine
neurons did not signal reward per se, but a RPE signal, similar
to those used in machine learning. This finding, along with
evidence that dopamine could modulate synaptic plasticity
FIGURE 1 | Meta-analysis of fMRI studies of value (taken from Bartra
et al., 2013). The authors extracted peak coordinates of activation from
206 published fMRI studies that investigated value computations. (A)
Significant clustering of positive responses. (B) Significant clustering of
negative responses. (C) Conjunction maps, showing regions with
significant clustering for both positive and negative responses. (D)
Results of a between-category comparison, showing regions with
significantly greater clustering for positive than negative effects. (E)
Detail of the striatum, illustrating overlap between the conjunction map
(Panel C) and the difference map (Panel D). These data demonstrate the
relative response of anterior insula, striatum and ventromedial PFC to
positive and negative value.
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(Calabresi et al., 2007; Surmeier et al., 2010) led to the theory that
dopamine acts as a learning (or reinforcement) signal that shapes
future motivated behavior. Subsequent research has shown that
dopamine may also encode predictions about upcoming rewards
and reward rate, thus acting as a value signal in the mesocortical
and mesolimbic dopaminergic pathways (Montague and Berns,
2002).
The main projection site of dopamine neurons is the striatum,
whose connectivity to frontal, limbic and insular cortex, provides
a mechanism whereby dopamine can act as a prediction error
signal driving both “Go” learning, which relates to actions with
positive outcomes, and “No Go” or avoidance learning, which
relates to actions that lead to punishment or an absence of reward.
First, dopamine signaling operates in two modes (Grace, 2000):
slow constant release of dopamine regulates tonic levels, which
mostly signal via dopamine D2 receptors on striatal medium
spiny neurons; phasic bursts of dopamine firing lead to large
increases in synaptic dopamine which signal via both the D1
and D2 receptor systems. D1 receptors have low affinity for
dopamine (Marcellino et al., 2012) and only respond to large
increases in synaptic dopamine released during phasic dopamine
neuron bursts that reflect positive RPEs, supporting learning to
approach rewarding stimuli (Frank, 2005). Dopamine D2 recep-
tors, on the other hand, have a higher affinity for dopamine,
allowing them to respond to tonic dopamine signaling, and to
detect transient reductions in tonic dopamine levels that follow
pauses in dopamine neuron firing during negative RPEs. This
facilitates learning to avoid negative outcomes (Frank, 2005).
The cortico-striatal system can be divided into a direct and an
indirect pathway (Figure 2), which have opposite effects on the
thalamus and hence cortex (Albin et al., 1989). In the dorsal
striatum, receptors are segregated, with the D1 receptors within
the direct pathway, related to action selection, while the D2
receptors control response inhibition within the indirect pathway
(Mink, 1996). This separation allows dopamine to drive both
reward (increases in dopamine signaling a better outcome than
expected) and punishment (reductions in tonic dopamine indi-
cated a worse outcome than expected). Frank proposed a model
in which phasic dopamine bursts following rewards promote
positive reinforcement while reductions in tonic dopamine levels
lead to negative reinforcement, each controlled by the D1/direct
pathway and the D2/indirect pathway, respectively (Cohen and
Frank, 2009). This computational model suggests that the RPE
dopamine signal promotes learning from positive outcomes via
stimulation of D1 receptors, whereas learning to avoid negative
outcomes is mediated via disinhibition of indirect pathway striatal
neurons secondary to a reduction of D2 receptor stimulation
during dopamine pauses (Cohen and Frank, 2009). A negative
outcome (punishment or lack of an expected reward) leads to
pause in the firing of dopamine neurons, which then leads to a
transient reduction in tonic dopamine. It should also be noted
that D2 receptor stimulation reduces excitability of neurons in
the indirect pathway (Hernandez-Lopez et al., 2000), therefore,
reductions in D2 receptor signaling have the effect of activating
the inhibitory “No Go” pathway. This allows for bidirectional
positive and negative reinforcement signaling by dopamine neu-
rons. Support for this model has been provided by numerous
FIGURE 2 | Basal ganglia model. A possible model whereby basal
ganglia compute the utility of gains and losses via two segregated
pathways in the corticostriato-thalamocortical circuit. Striatal output
neurons of the direct pathway express D1 receptors and project to the
internal globus pallidus (GPi) and the substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr),
and has an action selection effect on cerebral cortex. Striatal output
neurons in the indirect pathway express D2 receptors and reduce the
tonic inhibition of the external globus pallidus (GPe) on the GPi/SNr, which
leads to action inhibition in the cortex. D1 receptors respond mainly to
phasic (high concentration) dopamine signaling due to their low affinity for
dopamine. D2 receptors have high affinity for dopamine and respond to
lower tonic dopamine levels. Excitatory projections in green, inhibitory in
red.
experiments. Parkinson’s disease patients show enhanced posi-
tive learning when on their medications, but improved negative
learning while off medication (Frank et al., 2004). Pharmacolog-
ical manipulations also support the model (Frank and O’Reilly,
2006; Pizzagalli et al., 2008). The striatal release of dopamine
is linked to associative learning and habit formation via con-
trol of corticostriatal synaptic plasticity, which is affected in an
opposite manner by D1 and D2 signaling (Shen et al., 2008).
D1 dopamine receptor signaling promotes long-term potentiation
(Reynolds et al., 2001; Calabresi et al., 2007), whereas D2 receptor
signaling promotes long-term depression (Gerdeman et al., 2002;
Kreitzer and Malenka, 2007). Note that this model has been
tested most thoroughly at the level of the striatum. Multivariate
analysis of fMRI data shows that reinforcement and punishment
signals are ubiquitous in the brain, most notably in the entire
frontal cortex and striatum (Vickery et al., 2011). Less is known
about the information signaled by dopamine projections to brain
areas other than the striatum, such as frontal cortex, insula,
hippocampus and amygdala, or how the RPE signal is used by
these areas.
STRIATUM AND MONETARY REWARD
In human functional neuroimaging studies, changes in brain
activation have been demonstrated consistently in response to
monetary rewards (Thut et al., 1997; Elliott et al., 2000; Knutson
et al., 2000; Breiter et al., 2001; O’Doherty et al., 2007). Further,
studies have teased apart the different brain areas involved in the
various components of monetary reward, such as anticipation,
feedback, winning and losing. There seems to be a specialization
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within dopamine projection sites in relation to monetary reward:
anticipation of monetary reward increases activation in the VStr,
which includes the nucleus accumbens, while rewarding out-
comes increase activation in the ventral medial prefrontal cor-
tex, dorsal striatum, and posterior cingulate, with deactivation
in the aforementioned regions during reward omission (Elliott
et al., 2000; Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001b; Tricomi
et al., 2004). Neuroimaging experiments in humans suggest that
VStr activity strongly correlates with expected value, as well as
magnitude and probability (Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al.,
2001a, 2005; Abler et al., 2006; Yacubian et al., 2006; Rolls et al.,
2008). Work by D’Ardenne et al. (2008) supports a role for the
mesolimbic dopamine system in monetary RPE signaling. Acti-
vation of the ventral tegmental area, the origin of the mesolim-
bic dopamine circuit, reflected positive RPEs, whereas the VStr
encoded positive and negative RPEs. Similarly, Tom et al. (2007)
showed that VStr activity reflected potential monetary gains and
losses bidirectionally. This study also demonstrated that these
neural signals reflected individual variations in loss aversion, the
tendency for losses to be more impactful than potential gains.
Finally, the influential actor-critic model (Sutton and Barto, 1998)
proposes that the VStr uses prediction errors to update informa-
tion about expected future rewards while the dorsal striatum uses
this same prediction error signal to encode information about
actions that are likely to lead to reward. This distinction has
found support from fMRI experiments (O’Doherty et al., 2004;
Kahnt et al., 2009). Interestingly, the ability to update behavior
in response to RPE was shown to correlate with functional con-
nectivity between dorsal striatum and dopaminergic midbrain
(Kahnt et al., 2009). The imaging studies mentioned here support
the theory of dopamine as a RPE signal, at least in its striatal
projection.
INSULA AND RISK
The insula is frequently activated in functional neuroimaging
experiments (Duncan and Owen, 2000; Yarkoni et al., 2011).
Functionally it can be divided into three distinct subregions: a
ventroanterior region associated with chemosensory (Pritchard
et al., 1999) and socio-emotional processing (Sanfey et al., 2003;
Chang and Sanfey, 2009), a dorsoanterior region associated with
higher cognitive processing (Eckert et al., 2009), and a posterior
region associated with pain and sensorimotor processing (Craig,
2002; Wager et al., 2004). Different functional insular areas project
to different striatal targets: the VStr receives insular projections
primarily related to food and reward, whereas the dorsolat-
eral striatum receives insular inputs related to somatosensation
(Chikama et al., 1997).
The insular cortex is involved in decision-making processes
that involve uncertain risk and reward. Specifically, fMRI studies
have reported insular cortex involvement in risk-averse decisions
(Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005), risk avoidance and the representa-
tion of loss prediction (Paulus et al., 2003), monetary uncertainty
(Critchley et al., 2001), and encoding a risk prediction error
(Preuschoff et al., 2008). Patients with insular cortex damage place
higher wagers in comparison with healthy participants and their
betting is less sensitive to the odds of winning, with high wagers
even at unfavorable odds (Clark et al., 2008). Other research
suggests that optimum decisions involving risk depend on the
integrity of the insular cortex, showing that insula lesion patients
have altered decision-making involving both risky gains and risky
losses (Weller et al., 2009) (However see Christopoulos et al.,
2009). Specifically, insula damage was associated with a relative
insensitivity to expected value differences between choices. Previ-
ous research has shown that there is a dissociation between insula
and VStr, with VStr activation preceding risk-seeking choices, and
anterior insula activation predicting risk-averse choices (Kuhnen
and Knutson, 2005) suggesting that the VStr represents gain
prediction (Knutson et al., 2001a), while anterior insula repre-
sents loss prediction (Paulus et al., 2003). While imaging studies
also demonstrate a more general role of the anterior insula in
signaling the valence (positive or negative) of potential rewards
(Litt et al., 2011; Bartra et al., 2013) the lesion data argue that the
anterior insular cortex has a role in risk evaluation, specifically
in making risk-averse decisions. Indeed, in healthy subjects, the
insula is part of a value network that appears to track potential
losses in a way that correlates with individual loss aversion level
(Canessa et al., 2013). It is possible that an imbalance between
prefrontal-striatal circuitry and insular-striatal circuitry may lead
to suboptimal choices when weighing potential gains and losses,
as observed in pathological gamblers (Petry, 2001a; Goudriaan
et al., 2005).
PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING AMONG PATIENTS WITH
PARKINSON’S DISEASE
Pathological gambling was first reported in the context of Parkin-
son’s disease and dopamine replacement therapy in 2000 (Molina
et al., 2000). The lifetime prevalence of pathological gambling in
the general public is approximately 0.9 to 2.5% (Shaffer et al.,
1999). In Parkinson’s disease, the prevalence rates are higher, from
1.7 to 6.1% (Ambermoon et al., 2011; Callesen et al., 2013).
The risk factors associated with the occurrence of pathological
gambling in Parkinson’s disease are young age of Parkinson’s
disease onset, a personal or family history of drug or alcohol
abuse, depression, and relatively high impulsivity and novelty
seeking personality scores (Voon et al., 2007b). Interestingly, these
are similar to the risk factors for drug addiction and pathological
gambling in the general population. Also, there have been reports
of addiction to L-dopa in certain patients (e.g., Giovannoni et al.,
2000), a phenomenon that had already been noted in the 1980s.
It was perhaps initially surprising to find that Parkinson’s disease
patients can become addicted to their own medication or develop
behavioral addictions because they were thought to not possess
the personality type typical of addicted individuals. They are
generally described as industrious, punctual, inflexible, cautious,
rigid, introverted, slow-tempered, with lack of impulsiveness and
novelty seeking, and they have low lifetime risks for cigarette
smoking, coffee drinking, and alcohol use predating Parkinson’s
disease onset (Menza et al., 1993; Menza, 2000).
Dopamine replacement therapy has been implicated in the
development of pathological gambling in Parkinson’s disease
(Gschwandtner et al., 2001; Dodd et al., 2005) and a remission or
reduction of pathological gambling is typically noted after reduc-
tion or cessation of dopamine agonist medication (Gschwandtner
et al., 2001; Dodd et al., 2005). A broader set of behavioral
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 196 | 4
Clark and Dagher Dopamine’s role in risk taking
addictions termed impulse control disorders, including but not
limited to pathological gambling, compulsive sexual behavior,
and compulsive buying, have been reported in association with
dopamine replacement therapy (Weintraub et al., 2006; Voon
et al., 2007a; Dagher and Robbins, 2009). Dopamine agonists
(pramipexole, ropinirole and pergolide) appear to pose a greater
risk than L-Dopa monotherapy (Seedat et al., 2000; Dodd et al.,
2005; Pontone et al., 2006). Reducing the dopamine agonist and
increasing L-Dopa to achieve same motor response abolished
pathological gambling in affected individuals (Mamikonyan et al.,
2008), while a cross-sectional study of over 3000 Parkinson’s
disease patients found that taking a dopamine agonist increased
the odds of developing an impulse control disorder by 2.72
(Weintraub et al., 2010). Finally, these side-effects of dopamine
agonist therapy have been recently noted in other diseases, such
as restless leg syndrome, fibromyalgia and prolactinomas (Davie,
2007; Driver-Dunckley et al., 2007; Quickfall and Suchowersky,
2007; Tippmann-Peikert et al., 2007; Falhammar and Yarker,
2009; Holman, 2009). It should be noted however that some
studies have reported behavioral addictions and/or impulsiv-
ity and compulsivity in association with high-dose L-Dopa
monotherapy (Molina et al., 2000), deep brain stimulation for
Parkinson’s disease (Smeding et al., 2007), and in drug naïve
Parkinson’s disease patients (Antonini et al., 2011), all in the
absence of dopamine agonists. Nonetheless, the clinical evidence
overwhelmingly supports the theory that dopamine agonism at
the D2 receptor family is sufficient to cause impulse control
disorders.
BRAIN IMAGING STUDIES
NEUROTRANSMITTER IMAGING
Positron emission tomography (PET) imaging allows for changes
in endogenous levels of dopamine to be inferred from changes in
the binding of the [11C]raclopride to the dopamine D2 receptors.
The first [11C]raclopride PET study in this area was on Parkin-
son’s patients with dopamine dysregulation syndrome. Dopamine
dysregulation syndrome is characterized by the compulsive taking
of dopaminergic drugs, which is often comorbid with impulse
control disorders (Lawrence et al., 2003). Patients with dopamine
dysregulation syndrome exhibited enhanced L-Dopa induced
VStr dopamine release compared to similarly treated Parkinson’s
disease patients not compulsively taking dopaminergic drugs
(Evans et al., 2006). This was the first study to provide evidence
for sensitization of mesolimbic dopamine circuitry in Parkinson’s
disease patients prone to compulsive drug use. Subsequent studies
have supported a relative hyperdopaminergic state in Parkin-
son’s disease patients with pathological gambling. Three studies
mapping the concentration of dopamine reuptake transporters
(DAT) have shown reduced levels in the VStr of Parkinson’s
disease patients with impulse control disorders compared to
unaffected patients (Cilia et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2014; Voon et al.,
2014). Unfortunately the finding is non-specific, as reduced DAT
concentration can index either reduced nerve terminals (and
reduced dopamine signaling) or reduced DAT expression (and
therefore increased tonic dopamine levels). Supporting the lat-
ter hypothesis, impulse control patients demonstrate reduced
[11C]raclopride binding in the VStr compared to Parkinson’s
controls (Steeves et al., 2009), which is also consistent with
elevated tonic dopamine in this group. Note, however that this
result failed to be replicated in a similar study (O’Sullivan et al.,
2011).
However, these two [11C]raclopride PET studies reported a
greater reduction of VStr binding potential (an index of dopamine
release) during gambling (Steeves et al., 2009) and following
reward-related cue exposure (images of food, money, sex) com-
pared to neutral cues (O’Sullivan et al., 2011) in Parkinson’s
disease patients with impulse control disorders compared to
unaffected patients. This suggests an increased responsiveness of
striatal reward circuitry to gambling and reward-related cues in
those patients with impulse control disorders. In O’Sullivan et al.
(2011) dopamine release was only detected in the VStr and only
when subjects received a dose of oral L-Dopa just prior to scan-
ning, consistent with post-mortem data in Parkinson’s disease
showing that brain dopamine levels are much lower in dorsal
than VStr (Kish et al., 1988). These results are therefore consistent
with the sensitization hypothesis proposed by Evans et al. (2006).
More recently it was reported that Parkinson’s disease patients
with pathological gambling have a reduced concentration of
dopamine autoreceptors in the midbrain (Ray et al., 2012), which
is known to correlate with elevated dopaminergic responsivity
and increased impulsivity (Buckholtz et al., 2010). Finally, in
Parkinson’s disease patients, dopamine synthesis capacity, as mea-
sured by [18F]DOPA PET, correlates with a personality measure
of disinhibition, itself a risk factor for pathological gambling and
other addictions (Lawrence et al., 2013). In summary, PET studies
provide converging evidence of heightened dopaminergic tone
and increased dopamine response to reward cues as the under-
lying vulnerability in Parkinson’s disease patients who develop
pathological gambling during dopamine agonist treatment.
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING
Parkinson’s disease patients with pathological gambling show
enhanced hemodynamic responses to gambling-related visual
cues in the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex, left VStr, right
precuneus and medial prefrontal cortex (Frosini et al., 2010).
This is in line with similar experiments in pathological gambling
without Parkinson’s disease (Crockford et al., 2005; Ko et al.,
2009) and drug addiction (Wexler et al., 2001), supporting the
view that impulse control disorders in Parkinson’s disease may be
conceptualized as behavioral addictions.
Parkinson’s disease patients with an impulse control disor-
der show diminished BOLD activity in the right VStr during
risk taking and significantly reduced resting cerebral blood flow
in the right VStr compared to their healthy disease counter-
parts (Rao et al., 2010). Similarly, it was found that Parkinson’s
disease patients with impulse control disorders showed a bias
toward risky gambles compared to control patients, and that
dopamine agonists enhanced risk taking while decreasing VStr
activity (Voon et al., 2011). The authors suggested that dopamine
agonists may decouple brain activity from risk information in
vulnerable patients, thus favoring risky choices. Another fMRI
study reported that, relative to Parkinson’s controls, impulse con-
trol disorder Parkinson’s patients had decreased anterior insular
and orbitofrontal cortex RPE signals. They also showed that
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dopamine agonists increased the rate of learning from gain
outcomes, and increased striatal RPE activity, suggesting that
dopamine agonists may skew neural activity to encode “better
than expected” outcomes in Parkinson’s disease patients suscep-
tible to impulse control disorders (Voon et al., 2010).
While differences in striatal dopamine signaling may distin-
guish Parkinson’s disease patients who do and do not develop
pathological gambling, the mechanism of action by which
dopamine agonists change risk assessment remains unclear.
Dopamine agonists change the way in which the brains of
healthy individuals respond to the anticipation and feedback
of rewards. During reward feedback, administration of a single
dose of pramipexole to healthy adults caused decreased VStr
activity in a lottery game (Riba et al., 2008). Similarly, there
was reduced VStr activation when Parkinson’s patients received
a dose of L-Dopa compared to placebo (Cools et al., 2007).
This pattern of hypoactivation is reminiscent of that found in
pathological gamblers without Parkinson’s disease (Reuter et al.,
2005): during a simulated gambling task, pathological gamblers
showed decreased activation with respect to controls in the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex and the VStr. Severity of gambling
was negatively correlated with the BOLD effect in the VStr and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, suggesting that hypoactivity is a
predictor of gambling severity. As noted above, impulse control
disorder Parkinson’s patients were found to have diminished
resting perfusion as well as diminished BOLD activity during
risk taking in the VStr compared to Parkinson’s controls (Rao
et al., 2010). These studies suggest that dopamine agonists cause
individuals to seek rewards and make risky choices (Riba et al.,
2008), in the face of suppressed VStr response to rewards.
It should be noted however that reduced VStr activation
in fMRI experiments does not necessarily indicate reduced
dopaminergic signaling. There is evidence to support relatively
spared mesolimbic dopamine signaling as the risk factor for
pathological gambling in Parkinson’s disease. First, the repeated
taking of a dopaminergic medication for the treatment of
Parkinson’s disease could lead to sensitization of dopamine sig-
naling. VStr sensitization has been shown following repeated
amphetamine administration in humans (Boileau et al., 2006).
Moreover, in Parkinson’s disease the ventral portion of striatum
is relatively spared by the disease compared to the dorsal areas
(Kish et al., 1988), and thus dopamine replacement therapy, while
correcting the dopamine deficiency in the dorsal striatum to
normal levels, has the potential to raise dopamine levels in the
VStr circuit to higher than optimal levels (Cools et al., 2007). This
“overdose” theory was first proposed by Gotham et al. (1988)
to explain the fact that L-Dopa administration to Parkinson’s
disease patients, while improving some cognitive deficits, could
also cause specific impairments in other fronto-striatal cognitive
tasks. In the case of impulse control disorders, we propose that
excessive dopaminergic stimulation in the VStr obscures the dips
in dopamine signaling related to negative prediction errors.
The insula has also been implicated in imaging studies of
pathological gambling in Parkinson’s disease. In an fMRI study,
Ye et al. (2010) found that during the anticipation of monetary
rewards, a single dose of pramipexole (compared to placebo)
increased the activity of the VStr, enhanced the interaction
between the VStr and the anterior insula, but weakened the
interaction between the VStr and the prefrontal cortex, leading
to increased impulsivity. Cilia et al. (2008) found Parkinson’s
patients with pathological gambling showed resting over-activity
in brain areas in the mesocorticolimbic network, including the
insula. In an fMRI study, relative to Parkinson’s controls, impulse
control disorder patients had decreased anterior insular and
orbitofrontal cortex activity (van Eimeren et al., 2009; Voon et al.,
2010). Finally, in a study of Parkinson’s disease patients with and
without hypersexuality, a single dose of L-Dopa abolished the
normal insular deactivation seen in response to erotic pictures,
only in the hypersexual patients (Politis et al., 2013). Taken
together these results may suggest an imbalance between the
prefrontal-striatum connectivity and insula-striatum connectiv-
ity, favoring the influence of potential gains over that of potential
risks (losses) in decision-making.
RISK TAKING AND LOSS AVERSION
An influential framework for studying risky decision making is
prospect theory, developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
A key finding of their work is loss aversion, a tendency for
losses to loom larger than potential gains, and for individuals
to typically forego risky choices when less valuable safer alter-
natives exist. For example most people will reject the offer of
a coin flip unless the potential gain is considerably larger than
the potential loss. Impulsiveness, at least in a gambling context,
can be characterized as a reversal of loss aversion, and an over-
weighing of potential rewards relative to losses. It remains to be
seen whether loss aversion results from asymmetrical weighting
of gains and losses along a single value axis (Tom et al., 2007),
or from a competitive interaction between separate systems for
gains and losses (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; De Martino et al.,
2010). Possibly, both models are correct: recent fMRI evidence
(Canessa et al., 2013) shows bidirectional responses to losses and
gains in the VStr and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (positive for
gains) and the amygdala and insula (positive for losses). In both
cases, there is greater activation to potential losses, correlating
with individual loss aversion measured using prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). However, there are also brain
regions that respond uniquely to potential losses, namely the right
insula and the amygdala, once again reflecting individual varia-
tion in loss aversion (Canessa et al., 2013). In sum, a network of
regions centered on VStr, insula and amygdala seems to compute
gain and loss anticipation in a way that typically results in loss
aversion. Interestingly these structures, along with dorsal anterior
cingulate, form an intrinsic connectivity network as identified
by resting state fMRI. This network is thought to be involved in
detecting and processing emotionally salient events (Seeley et al.,
2007).
Loss aversion can be explained on an emotional basis, with
both potential gains and losses influencing behavior via different
emotions (Loewenstein et al., 2001), namely motivation on the
gain side and anxiety for losses. Such a model might tie the
former to the nucleus accumbens and the latter to the amygdala
and insula. In either case, it is conceivable that individuals who
are relatively less loss averse may also be at risk for impulsive
behaviors such as drug addiction and gambling, due to relative
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under valuation of losses, although surprisingly this has yet to
be formally tested.
There is some evidence implicating the striatum in reversal
of normal loss aversion in pathological gamblers. Loss of stri-
atal dopamine neurons in Parkinson’s disease is associated with
reduced risk-taking behavior compared to control subjects (Brand
et al., 2004; Labudda et al., 2010), while chronic administration
of dopamine agonists, especially in high doses, reverses this
tendency and promotes risky behavior and impulsivity (Dagher
and Robbins, 2009). In the healthy brain, acute administration
of D2 dopamine agonists may also cause an increase in risky
choices in humans (Riba et al., 2008) and rats (St Onge and
Floresco, 2009). Acute D2/D3 receptor stimulation has been found
to produce complex changes in the value of losses judged worth
chasing (chasing being the continued gambling to recover losses)
(Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2011). Taken together, this suggests
dopamine, acting on the striatum and possibly other mesolimbic
structures, may modulate loss aversion. Two studies in Parkinson’s
disease patients not affected by impulse control disorders found
that a single dose of the dopamine agonist pramipexole reduced
loss prediction error coding in the orbitofrontal cortex in one case
(van Eimeren et al., 2009) and the orbitofrontal cortex and insula
in the other (Voon et al., 2010). In sum, tonic dopamine activity
appears to reduce loss prediction signaling, and may therefore
reduce loss aversion.
We propose a general framework based on prospect theory,
in which the anticipation of potential losses and rewards is com-
puted, possibly in separate brain regions initially, and integrated
to compute a decision value (Figure 3). We speculate that gain
anticipation might be computed in the ventral medial prefrontal
cortex, based on numerous imaging studies implicating this area
in computation of value (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Plassmann
et al., 2007; Bartra et al., 2013). As reviewed above, the amygdala
and insula may be involved in computing loss anticipation. A
possible site for the final computation of value, at least for the
purpose of updating choices and action plans, is the striatum,
which has fairly direct access to brain regions involved in action
planning (van der Meer et al., 2012). The striatum has inher-
ent roles in both response-reward associations (dorsal striatum)
(Alexander and Crutcher, 1990) and creating stimulus-reward
contingencies (VStr), which afford it the unique opportunity for
computation of value (Packard and Knowlton, 2002). Striatal
value signals can promote reinforcement processes leading to the
updating of future actions, strategies and habits, mediated by
the dorsal striatum, while also driving appetitive reward seeking
behavior via the VStr. For a review of the role of the striatum
in value coding see Knutson et al. (2008); Bartra et al. (2013).
The balance between gain and loss evaluation systems may be
modulated at least in part by dopamine. We propose a model in
which tonic dopamine, acting via the indirect basal ganglia path-
way (Figure 2) regulates inhibitory control manifesting as loss
aversion. Here lower levels of tonic dopamine would be associated
with increased loss aversion. Conversely, phasic dopamine, acting
via the direct pathway, would increase the value of gains. This is
based on the finding that young healthy subjects given a single
dose of the dopamine agonist cabergoline show reduced learning
in response to gains (positive feedback), due presumably to a
FIGURE 3 | A model of decision-making based on prospect theory. (A)
The utility of potential gains and losses is given by the following equation:
u(x) = (x)α for potential gains and u(x) = −λ · (−x)β for losses
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). When the loss aversion parameter λ is
greater than 1 the function is steeper in the loss domain, implying loss
aversion. In this model the utility of gains and losses is computed by
different neural networks and combined at some point. We list regions
that may be implicated in the calculation. (B) Dopamine may influence the
shape of the utility function for gains and losses, by affecting any of the
parameters α,β or λ to regulate the degree of loss aversion. Tonic and
phasic dopamine may modulate gain and loss calculation via the direct and
indirect basal ganglia pathways (Figure 2). The balance of tonic and phasic
dopamine signaling could regulate the balance between action selection
and inhibition, regulating the current level of loss aversion.
presynaptic effect (in low doses, cabergoline, a D2 agonist, reduces
phasic dopamine neuron firing via actions on the high affinity
D2 autoreceptor, located pre-synaptically on dopamine neurons)
(Frank and O’Reilly, 2006). Conversely, haloperidol, a D2 antag-
onist, increased learning from gains, probably due to its ability
to enhance phasic dopamine firing. With respect to Parkinson’s
disease, if a patient has an individual vulnerability to undervalue
losses, then dopamine agonist therapy, which tonically stimulates
D2 receptors and blocks sensing of the phasic dopamine dips
associated with negative rewards, (Frank et al., 2004, 2007), could
result in even lower loss aversion. One interpretation is that the
intensity of phasic activity sets the gain on the value of potential
rewards, while the tonic stimulation of D2 receptors blocks the
negative feedback associated with losses.
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Parkinson’s disease patients show enhanced positive learning
when on dopaminergic medications, and improved negative
learning while off medication, compared to age-matched controls
(Frank et al., 2004). Treatment with dopamine D2 agonists is now
accepted as the cause of impulse control disorders in Parkinson’s
disease, in which problem gambling is phase locked to medication
use. In the model proposed here, D2 stimulation would reduce
loss aversion via the indirect corticostriatal pathway. We suggest
that under D2 agonist treatment, these patients have a tendency
to undervalue losses and be more risk seeking. This is consistent
with the observation that Parkinson’s disease patients’ deficits in
risky decision making is dominated by impaired ability to use
negative feedback (Labudda et al., 2010). The effect on gain, risk,
and loss processing of dopamine signaling in other parts of the
mesolimbic and mesocortical system, notably the vmPFC, OFC,
insula and amygdala, remains to be investigated in greater depth.
Loss tolerance profile may also be affected by norepinephrine
signaling. In healthy volunteers, a single dose of the centrally
acting beta blocker propranolol reduced the perceived magnitude
of losses (Rogers et al., 2004) and normal variations in nore-
pinephrine reuptake transporter in the thalamus, as assessed by
PET, correlate with loss aversion (Takahashi et al., 2013). An
explanation for this is that norepinephrine increases the arousal
response to potential losses, and low norepinephrine signaling
may therefore reduce loss aversion. While norepinephrine neu-
rons are also affected in Parkinson’s disease, their role in the
motivational and impulsive aspects of the disease have yet to be
investigated (Vazey and Aston-Jones, 2012).
CONCLUSION
The causal association between dopamine D2 receptor agonism
and impulse control disorders in Parkinson’s disease has impli-
cations for addiction more generally. First, not all individuals
develop addictive syndromes following dopamine replacement
therapy; those who do appear to have relatively preserved
dopamine signaling in the mesolimbic pathway, possibly through
a combination of their specific pattern of neurodegeneration,
sensitization and pre-morbid vulnerability (as evidenced by the
fact that a family history of addiction is a risk factor). It is conceiv-
able that enhanced mesolimbic transmission is also a risk factor
in the general population (Buckholtz et al., 2010). Second, it is
clear that D2 receptor agonism alone is sufficient for the develop-
ment of the addictive syndrome. While combined D1/D2 agonists
such as L-Dopa may themselves be addictive (Lawrence et al.,
2003), D2 agonists are not typically administered compulsively;
rather, they have the ability to promote other addictions such as
pathological gambling (O’Sullivan et al., 2011). This is supported
by animal experiments (Collins and Woods, 2009), computational
neuroscience models (Cohen and Frank, 2009), and molecular
biology evidence (Shen et al., 2008) suggesting that D1 receptor
stimulation is reinforcing while D2 receptor stimulation inhibits
the inhibitory indirect pathway. We suggest that D2 agonism,
in vulnerable individuals, has the effect of “releasing the brake”
on reinforcement systems, thus facilitating the development of
impulse control disorders. The time-locked nature of the D2
effect, and the fact that addictive behaviors typically resolve upon
discontinuation of the dopamine agonist, is consistent with the
theory that tonic dopamine has an invigorating effect on reward
seeking behavior (Niv et al., 2007; Dagher and Robbins, 2009).
We note however that other mechanisms besides dopamine-
mediated disruption of responses to reinforcing events and stim-
uli may play a role. For example, Averbeck et al. (2014) have
proposed that Parkinson’s disease patients with impulse control
disorders are uncertain about using future information to guide
behavior, which could lead to impulsivity (a tendency to privi-
lege immediate action). Also, frontal lobe deficits (Djamshidian
et al., 2010) could also lead to impulsivity through impaired self-
control. These mechanisms need not be mutually exclusive.
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